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HE Texas Legislature has made no further changes in the law affect-
ing parent and child since the massive reforms enacted during the
sixty-eighth session in 1983.1 Congress, however, has enacted sub-
stantial changes in the Social Security Act through the Child Support En-
forcement Amendments of 1984,2 which will have a significant effect on
Texas family law.3 The cornerstone of the new law is simplification of meth-
ods for collecting past-due child support through mandatory wage withhold-
ing.4  Fortunately, in 1983 the voters of Texas amended the Texas
Constitution to permit such withholding. 5 Unfortunately, the enabling legis-
lation that the Texas Legislature passed in 19836 does not fully comply with
the requirements of the federal law. The legislature, therefore, will have to
make a number of changes to those sections of the Family Code dealing with
enforcement and assignment of income for child support.
7
The changes required will not be in policy, but in method of implementa-
tion, and are intended to benefit all children in single-parent homes, not
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
1. See Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw.
L.J. 173-77 (1984).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (amending Social Security Act by placing proce-
dural requirements on states to increase likelihood that children eligible for support will obtain
it).
3. The American Bar Association considers the enforcement of child support so impor-
tant that it has established a special child support project. Information concerning child sup-
port enforcement may be obtained by writing to:
Child Support Project, National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
Protection
American Bar Association
1800 M. Street, N.W., Suite S-200
Washington, D.C. 20036
4. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, sec. 3(b), § 466(a)(1), 98 Stat. at
1306 (providing for wage withholding to collect delinquent child support).
5. TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 28.
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.09, .091 (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-1983) (con-
cerning enforcement of orders and assignment of income for child support, respectively).
7. See id. Having already lengthened the statute of limitations for paternity actions to 20
years, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983), Texas is in conformity
with the federal statute on this issue. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,
sec. 3(b), § 466(a)(5), 98 Stat. at 1307 (requiring procedures permitting paternity determina-
tion until child turns 18).
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merely those receiving public assistance. 8 To simplify collection of past-due
support, Texas will have to require that all new decrees or modifications of
prior decrees for child support contain a provision for the withholding of
income, should the support fall into arrears. 9 If an arrearage occurs, the
machinery for wage garnishment can be activated without any loss of time. 10
Additionally, whenever one of the parents works for a concern that provides
medical insurance benefits for dependents of its employees, the support order
will need to include this insurance coverage.1 While the Texas Family
Code mandates an involuntary wage assignment after the obligor has fallen
two months in arrears, 12 the federal act will require that the period be short-
ened to one month. 13
The Child Support Enforcement Amendments also enacted a number of
changes affecting the employer who is required to withhold wages. 14 These
changes include requirements that the states establish methods to simplify
the withholding process for employers and to penalize employers for
amounts not withheld. 15 In addition to these employer-related changes, the
Child Support Enforcement Amendments provide further protection for the
employee subject to a wage assignment order. The Amendments require
that states provide for the imposition of a fine against any employer who
discharges, refuses to employ, or takes disciplinary action against an em-
ployee simply because he is subject to a wage assignment order. 16
The Child Support Enforcement Amendments require the governor of
each state to appoint a State Commission on Child Support by December 1,
1984.17 The Amendments do not specify the number of members compris-
ing the Commission, but the membership must represent all aspects of the
child support system, including custodial and non-custodial parents, admin-
istrators, members of the judiciary, and others involved in child welfare pro-
grams.18 The Amendments require that the Commission study the
effectiveness of the operation of the state's support system and report its
findings to the governor no later than October 1, 1985.19
Finally, the Amendments require that each state establish statewide guide-
8. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, § 23(a)(b), 98 Stat. at 1329.
9. Id. sec. 3(b), § 466(a)(1), (b)(2), 98 Stat. at 1306-07, 1308.
10. The withholding provision requirement is primarily intended to benefit children who
fall under the provisions of subchapter IV, Part A of the Social Security Statute, Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-605 (1982) (providing for federally
funded state programs for aid and services to needy families with children). Since courts can-
not know in advance which children might be affected, the withholding provision will have to
apply to all decrees.
11. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, sec. 16, § 452(0, 98 Stat. at 1321.
12. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.091(p)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
13. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, sec. 3(b), § 466(b)(3)(A), 98 Stat.
at 1308.
14. Id. § 466(b)(6), 98 Stat. at 1309.
15. Id. § 466(b)(6)(B), (D).
16. Id. § 466(b)(6)(D).
17. Id. § 15, 98 Stat. at 1320-21.
18. Id. § 15(b), 98 Stat. at 1320.
19. Id. § 15(c), (d).
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lines for child support awards by October 1, 1987.20 These guidelines may
be created legislatively, judicially, or administratively, but need not be bind-
ing. The Texas guidelines should supplement the recently enacted section in
the Family Code pertaining to the factors courts are to consider for support
and the recommendations for the use of formulas and guidelines. 2 1 The
federal requirement of statewide guidelines is consistent with the Texas Leg-
islature's expressed interest in uniformity, as evidenced by its request that
courts publish local rules pertaining to formulas and schedules.22
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the 1983-1984 term the United States Supreme Court did not de-
cide many cases in the family law area. In Palmore v. Sidoti23 the Court
reversed a Florida trial court's judgment as to the custody of a child, because
the decision was based on race and not on the fitness of the parents. 24 The
white mother was granted custody of the child in an earlier divorce proceed-
ing. After the mother married a black man, the white father sought a
change in custody. Although the trial court determined that both parents
were fit and the new step-father was respectable, it found that, despite recent
strides in improved race relations, a white child in a racially mixed home
would suffer from social stigmatization. 25 The Supreme Court, relying on a
number of earlier decisions, 26 found that this ruling denied constitutional
rights based on the Equal Protection Clause.27 While the decision serves as
a reminder to Texas courts to eschew race as a basis for their decisions,
Texas court opinions are not likely to exhibit the same candor as the Florida
court. A Texas court of appeals reversed a recent trial court decision be-
cause the trial court had based its decision on the premise that women were
better at raising children than men.
28
Another United States Supreme Court decision of interest to Texas is
20. Id. secs. 18(a), § 467(a), 18(b), 98 Stat. at 1321-22.
21. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983) provides that
when determining the amount of child support the court must consider all appropriate factors,
including the needs of the child, the ability of the parents to contribute to the child's support,
the financial resources available, and any schedules, guidelines, and formulas the court has
adopted.
22. Id.
23. 104 S. Ct. 1879, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1984).
24. Id. at 1881, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 424. The appellate court affirmed per curiam without
opinion, denying the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the case under the authority
of Article V, § 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Id.; see Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356,
1359 (Fla. 1980) (holding that Florida Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review per curiam
decisions of state appellate courts rendered without opinion when basis for review is alleged
conflict with decision of another court of appeals or supreme court).
25. 104 S. Ct. at 1881, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 424.
26. Id. at 1882-83, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 425-26 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1800)).
27. 104 S. Ct. at 1882, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 426.
28. Glud v. Glud, 641 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ) (trial court
violated mandate of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1975) that sex must not be
basis of custody decision).
1985]
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Irving Independent School District v. Tatro.29 In this case the Court finally
resolved the issue of whether clean intermittent catheterization (CIC),3° nec-
essary to the special education of a handicapped child, is a "related service"
as defined in the Education of the Handicapped Act. 31 The Court held CIC
to be a related service and ordered the Irving School District to provide this
procedure to the plaintiff's eight-year-old daughter during school hours.
The Court based its finding on the fact that CIC is not a medical service,
since a layperson can administer it with minimal training. 32 The Court anal-
ogized this service to the requirement of modification of school buildings to
make them accessible to handicapped children. 33 In a situation like the one
in Tatro CIC permits the child to remain at school; thus, the procedure is as
important to the educational process as the ability to enter the school in the
first place.34 The language of the opinion indicates that the Court intends a
broad interpretation of the language of the Education of the Handicapped
Act. This decision should forewarn school districts that the exclusion of
handicapped children from the mainstream of education, based on the in-
convenience of unusual procedures, will not be tolerated. The Court did
find, however, that the school district was not liable for attorney's fees, 35
since relief was granted under the Education of the Handicapped Act 36 and
not under the Rehabilitation Act.3 7
III. STATUS
After their seventeen-year-old son made unauthorized withdrawals from
their bank accounts that resulted in their son's conviction for forgery, the
plaintiffs in Amarillo National Bank v. Terry38 requested the bank to recredit
their accounts in the amounts withdrawn. The bank complied, but relying
on the Texas Family Code provisions concerning parental liability,3 9 refused
to repay the first $5,000. The plaintiffs sued the bank to recover the full
amount of their loss and the jury found for the plaintiffs. The appellate
29. 104 S. Ct. 3371, 82 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1984).
30. CIC is a procedure involving the insertion of a catheter into the urethra to drain the
bladder. Id. at 3371, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 664.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982). "Related services" are defined as "transportation, and
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including . . . medical and
counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation
purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special educa-
tion... " Id.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 3378, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 674.
33. Id. at 3377, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 672-73.
34. CIC was absolutely necessary for the education of the plaintiffs daughter because she
needed catheterization every three or four hours to avoid injury to her kidneys.
35. See Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3474, 82 L. Ed. 2d 746, 770-71 (1984) (disal-
lowing attorney's fees under Rehabilitation Act for claim ultimately allowed under Education
of the Handicapped Act).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982).
37. 29 U.S.C. 794 (1982). The Education of the Handicapped Act has no provision for
attorney's fees, while the Rehabilitation Act does.
38. 658 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
39. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01, .02 (Vernon 1975). Effective June 10, 1981, § 33.02
allows increased recovery not to exceed $15,000 per act. Id. § 33.02 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1975-1983).
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court affirmed, holding that the statute imposes liability for property dam-
age, while the bank had suffered only an economic loss.4° In addition, the
court held that the bank failed to prove the necessary elements of its case.41
On remand from the Texas Supreme Court, 42 the appellate court in Win-
inger v. Department of Human Resources43 affirmed the trial court's perma-
nent injunction against the operation of a child-care facility. The Fort
Worth court of appeals held that the statutes authorizing the injunction44
were not unconstitutionally broad and also upheld the constitutionality of
the legislature's delegation of authority to regulate child-care facilities to the
Department of Human Resources.45 The Department requested the injunc-
tion because the appellant failed to comply with the rules and regulations
pertaining to registered family homes. In another case46 the Department
failed to close an unlicensed facility. Parents of a child who died while in the
facility's care sued Department employees who had inspected the day-care
center. The court held that state employees who gather facts and then act
on them are immune from liability because their actions are quasi-judicial. 47
In Rodriguez v. Ysleta Independent School District48 the court upheld the
school district's requirement that a child, even though a bona-fide resident of
the district, must reside with a parent, guardian, or other court-ordered rela-
tion to attend tuition-free public school.49 The court held the requirements
valid, noting that instances arise when a school district must contact a par-
ent or guardian.50 Persons residing in districts with this requirement who
have unrelated children in their care should apply to the courts for a conser-
vatorship order before the child enters school.
Maintaining discipline is an important problem for schools, but student
safety is of primary concern. If a student is injured in the classroom while
under the supervision of a teacher, that teacher is immune from liability if he
is acting within the scope of his employment. 51 A teacher may still be liable,
however, for negligently injuring a student while disciplining him.5 2 The
40. 658 S.W.2d at 704.
41. Id. at 704-05. TEX. FAM. CODE.ANN. § 33.01(2) (Vernon 1975) requires the child's
conduct to have been willful and malicious. Although the Terrys admitted that their son's
conduct was willful, they had not admitted that it was willful and malicious, and the bank had
not proved that the conduct was willful and malicious.
42. Department of Human Resources v. Wininger, 657 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1983) (reversing
on pleading error).
43. 663 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
44. TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 42.074 (Vernon 1980).
45. 663 S.W.2d at 914-15.
46. Augustine v. Nusom, 671 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Id. at 115. A state employee with quasi-judicial status enjoys immunity from personal
liability as long as he is acting in good faith within the scope of his authority. Baker v. Story,
621 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. 663 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
49. Id. at 551.
50. Id.
51. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.912(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984); see Barr v. Bernhard, 562
S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1978) (interpreting § 21.912(b) as immunizing professional school em-
ployees from liability except when negligently disciplining students).
52. Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1978).
1985]
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court in Diggs v. Bales53 held that a teacher was not negligent in supervising
the classroom. 54 In another case, administering three punitive spanks for
using abusive language to a bus driver was not a violation of due process,
even though the parents had requested a three-day suspension as punishment
for the student. 5 The Fifth Circuit held that even though the regulations of
the district were not followed, such discipline did not violate the student's
constitutional rights, since she requested the alternative of the spanks. 56
Two high school seniors were also denied relief57 after their grades were
reduced as punishment for using alcohol on a school-sponsored trip. The
students contended that the district violated their constitutional rights, since
neither the policy manual nor the student handbook mentioned that the dis-
trict could reduce their grades in addition to suspending the students. 58 The
trial court agreed and granted a permanent injunction against any grade re-
duction. The appellate court ruled, however, that since school officials dis-
cussed these penalties at a number of high school assemblies, the students
had notice and were not deprived of their constitutional rights.59 The court
held that school policy relating to discipline need not be in writing to be
legally enforceable and dissolved the injunction.6°
Schools and parents are still struggling to comply with the provisions of
the Education of the Handicapped Act.6 1 In Scokin v. Texas62 the parents
requested reimbursement of expenditures for private schooling for their
child after they unilaterally removed her from public school. The court de-
nied relief, but determined that the appropriate state statute of limitations
under the Act 63 is the two-year statute generally applicable to tort claims. 64
In David H. v. Spring Branch Independent School District,65 which in-
volved a petition for reimbursement of expenditures for private schooling for
a learning-disabled child, the court granted partial relief.66 Although they
had learned of new laws granting legal rights to handicapped children, the
parents delayed a whole year before contacting the school district for re-
evaluation of the child. They alleged that uncertainty about how their child
would function in a public school and about their legal rights caused the
delay.67 The court held that uncertainty was not good cause for delay and
53. 667 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
54. Id. at 918. The court refused to read § 21.912(b) more broadly than Barr v. Bernhard.
55. Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. School Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. The court dismissed the action. Id.
57. New Braunfels Indep. School Dist. v. Armke, 658 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Waco
1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 331.
59. Id. at 332. The rights allegedly violated were the students' rights to public education
and a liberty interest in their good names. Id.
60. Id.
61. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982).
62. 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 438.
64. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
65. 569 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
66. Id. at 1340.
67. Id.
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did not allow reimbursement for the parents' expenditures for that year. 68
The court found, however, that the school district failed to provide the spe-
cial treatment the Act required. 69 The school had recommended that the
parents place the child in a class for the educable mentally retarded, rather
than one for the learning disabled. The court held that such inappropriate
placement was discriminatory under the Rehabilitation Act70 and that the
parents were entitled to partial recovery for their expenditures. 71
In answer to the question of whether a private secondary institution may
withhold a student's academic records because of unpaid tuition, the Attor-
ney General of Texas stated that an institution that does not receive state
funds is not a governmental body. 72 A private school, therefore, need not
comply with the Texas Open Records Act.73 The Federal Family Education
and Privacy Act 74 may cause the institution to lose federal funds, however, if
the school does not permit the parents to inspect and review the records. 7"
When the Texas Legislature passed the Education Reform Act 76 it in-
cluded a provision requiring the University Interscholastic League to submit
its rules and procedures to the State Board of Education.77 The Board is
empowered to approve, disapprove, or modify any rules submitted to it.78
Perhaps this provision will result in less litigation concerning eligibility.
In Smith v. Cornelius79 a court of civil appeals found the four-year pater-
nity statute in effect from 1981 to 198380 unconstitutional. 8' For a defend-
ant who is ultimately determined to be the father, this finding may prove
quite expensive if the court follows the reasoning of Adams v. Stotts.82 Ad-
ams held that when awarding child support after paternity has been estab-
lished, the court should consider expenses of the child from the date of its
birth. 83
Paternity is often difficult to establish. In In re J.J.R. 84 the alleged father
specifically denied any sexual relationship with the mother. Despite testi-
mony that blood tests, the results of which would exclude greater than
ninety percent of the male population, had failed to exclude the defendant,
the trial court found for the alleged father. The appellate court affirmed,
holding that a blood test is merely another piece of evidence for the trier of
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1335; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
71. 569 F. Supp. at 1336, 1340.
72. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-154 (1984).
73. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 2(1)(F), 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (1982).
75. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen, No. JM-154 (1984).
76. Ch. 28, 1984 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 269 (Vernon).
77. Id. pt. IV, sec. 2, § 21.921(b), at 402.
78. Id.
79. 665 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
80. Id. at 183 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983),
amended by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)).
81. 665 S.W.2d at 184.
82. 667 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
83. Id. at 799.
84. 669 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ dism'd).
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fact to consider.8 5 In C. G. W. v. B.F W,86 however, the appellate court found
that properly conducted blood tests can be legally conclusive as to nonpater-
nity.8 7 In this divorce case the tests were extensive and included the hus-
band's parents as well as the husband, wife, and child. The trial court had
admitted the blood test evidence, but at the conclusion of the trial without a
jury did not mention such evidence in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The trial court concluded that the child was the child of the marriage.
The appellate court disagreed and held that properly conducted blood tests
may be conclusive regarding biological impossibility.88 The dissent based its
conclusion on the long-held presumption that a child born or conceived in
wedlock is legitimate.8 9 This presumption was the law at the time of the
divorce action, since the legislature had not yet enacted the provision for
determining paternity of married fathers.90
An ex parte divorce that terminates an alleged informal marriage does not
necessarily establish the paternity of a child born during that marriage for
social security purposes. In Conlon v. Heckler9 the court held that a Texas
divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit.92 Under the concept of
divisible divorce, 9 3 however, a decree rendered without personal jurisdiction
over one of the spouses is not conclusive as to all the accoutrements of mar-
riage. 94 The child, a girl, was born in March 1969, approximately nine
months after a two-week liaison between the putative father and the mother.
In January 1970 the mother filed for divorce. The putative father was served
notice in Vermont, but he neither answered nor appeared in the divorce pro-
ceedings. The mother made no assertion of personal jurisdiction under the
Texas long-arm statute9 5 at the time. The decree stated that one child was
born of the marriage. 96 After the putative father died, the mother applied
for survivor's benefits for the child. These benefits were denied because the
court had not established the child's paternity. Even if the court had estab-
lished paternity, the girl might have been considered illegitimate, requiring
her to have been dependent on her father at the time of his death to qualify
for benefits. 97 The reasoning of the court is most ingenious, since it asserts
that it is giving full faith and credit98 to the divorce while at the same time
denying that a child born during the marriage is a legitimate child of the
85. Id. at 843.
86. 675 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
87. Id. at 330.
88. Id. at 326.
89. Id. at 331 (Esquivel, J., dissenting).
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
91. 719 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1983).
92. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301 (1942).
93. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
94. 719 F.2d at 796, 799. The Conlon court held that "a court's decree of divorce is
separable from its declarations in that decree regarding the incidents of marriage, including
alimony, support, custody, and paternity."
95. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031(b) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1984).
96. 719 F.2d at 791.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), (d)(3) (1982).
98. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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marriage. The presumption that a child born during the marriage is a legiti-
mate child of the marriage has been considered one of the strongest legal
presumptions.99 The real basis for the decision is found in a footnote: ° ° the
court did not believe that the Texas court's finding of an informal marriage
was correct. The court could not, however, collaterally attack the Texas
judgment, so while not disputing the putative father's paternity, it based its
legal holding on the need for in personam jurisdiction to determine pater-
nity.10 1 The unfortunate result was that the federal government became a
co-conspirator with the child's irresponsible father in denying her support.
In Hickey v. Johnson10 2 the plaintiff established an equitable adoption
through both oral and written evidence. The appellate court held that the
defendant's requested instruction cautioning the jury to regard with suspi-
cion oral agreements to adopt was properly refused as a comment on the
weight of the evidence. 103 The testimony of step-children attempting to es-
tablish their status as equitable adoptees, based on the deceased's oral
promises, however, is inadmissable absent some corroborative testimony. 1° 4
Thus, even though evidence indicated a loving relationship between a de-
ceased man and his step-children, the trial court correctly granted a directed
verdict denying the claims of the step-children.10 5 The court in Flynn v.
State10 6 held that actions of the parties can create a parent-child relationship
despite the absence of formal adoption proceedings. 10 7 An aunt who
claimed to have adopted a child was considered to have equitably adopted
him, thus qualifying her to serve as a parent in a juvenile proceeding and
obviating the need to appoint a guardian ad litem. 0 8
A "recognized" illegitimate child may not contest a will. The court held
in Mills v. Edwards'° 9 that the only method for an illegitimate child to in-
herit from his father is contained in the Probate Code. 110 Since the father
had failed to comply with any of the legal methods for establishing legiti-
macy, the plaintiff had no interest in the estate."'
The Texas appellate courts seem determined to limit the rights of adopted
persons. In Pope v. First National Bank 1 2 the aunt of the claimant's alleged
adoptive father had established a trust for the benefit of the alleged adoptive
99. Joplin v. Meadows, 623 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
100. 719 F.2d at 792 n.2.
101. The court required in personam jurisdiction since the suit affected the putative father's
personal rights. Id. at 797.
102. 672 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
103. Id. at 34.
104. Defoeldvar v. Defoeldvar, 666 S.W.2d 668, 671-72 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no
writ) (citing TEX. R. EvID. 601(b)).
105. Defoeldvar v. Defoeldvar, 666 S.W.2d 668, 671-72 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no
writ).
106. 667 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
107. Id. at 237-38.
108. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.11 (Vernon 1975)).
109. 665 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
110. Id. at 155; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980).
111. 665 S.W.2d at 155.
112. 658 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
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father. Upon his death without descendants, the trust was to terminate and
be distributed to two nieces of the settlor. The court, without attempting to
determine whether adoption by estoppel had occurred, held that the claim-
ant could not take under the trust because he was not in privity with the
designees of the trust. 113 A strong dissent complained that the courts were
making second-class citizens of children adopted by estoppel, while the
Texas Supreme Court had not yet ruled dispositively on the issue.1 14
In Lehman v. Corpus Christi National Bank1 15 the Texas Supreme Court
reversed an appellate court decision that held that adopted adults do not
have the same inheritance rights as adopted children. 16 The supreme court
held that a will defining descendants as children and issue and stating that
"issue shall always include those who were adopted" includes adopted
adults. 117 When the will itself is clear, noted the court, no need exists to
look to outside law.1 8
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
In any suit concerning the parent-child relationship the making of a rec-
ord is mandatory unless the court has approved an express waiver. 119 A
default judgment decreed without a record is, therefore, subject to a writ of
error and will be reversed and remanded.120 Even if the question of conser-
vatorship is not raised on appeal, the lack of a record can taint the entire
proceeding, necessitating a remand on the subjects of property division and
child support. 12 1 Even if a record is made, a court must have jurisdiction
over the affected party before it can enter a binding order concerning prop-
erty or custody rights. In Kramer v. Kramer122 neither the children nor the
husband were before the court, and the wife failed to make any showing that
any of them had ever been in Texas. Since the husband had entered a plea to
stay the proceeding under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act,' 23 the
appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to abate the
proceedings.
Absent a written agreement by the parties, trial courts cannot order joint
managing conservatorships for the sole purpose of resolving a custody dis-
113. Id. at 766.
114. Id. at 768 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
115. 668 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1984).
116. Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank, 665 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi
1983), rev'd, 668 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1984). The appellate court relied on the wrongly decided
Foster v. Foster, 641 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
117. 668 S.W.2d at 688.
118. Id. at 689.
119. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14(d) (Vernon 1975) ("A record shall be made as in
civil cases generally unless waived by the parties with the consent of the court.").
120. Hunter v. Hunter, 666 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] !94, no
writ). The Hunter court expressly held that the language of § 11.14(d) is mandatory. Id.
121. Stubbs v. Stubbs, 671 S.W.2d 70, 74 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ granted).
122. 668 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
123. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1982) (providing for stay of judicial proceedings because of
military service).
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pute. 124 This rule appears to be based on both statutory construction1 25 and
common sense.1 26 Third parties may not initiate custody proceedings unless
they can fit the statutory definition of persons with "an interest in the
child."1 27 Thus, a great-grandmother was adjudged to have no standing,1 28
as were an aunt and uncle. ' 29 The court did not dismiss the latter case, how-
ever, because the record indicated that the aunt and uncle might be able to
establish standing by showing that they had possession of the child for six
months prior to the suit. 1 30 The court reversed and remanded for a determi-
nation of the standing issue.1 31 The death of a parent appealing a custody
decree will moot the action. 132
Absent compelling reasons, a court will not divide the custody of siblings,
but if sufficient evidence to divide custody is introduced, an appellate court
will not overturn the judgment of a trial court. 133 When grandparents inter-
vene in a divorce proceeding to be appointed managing conservators, they
need not show that the natural parent is unfit. The grandparents need only
show that they will be superior custodians of the child134 and that such a
decree is in the best interest of the child.' 35 In Wimpey v. Wimpey136 the
court did not find sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the judg-
ment, but determined that the trial court could consider a social study in its
entirety when determining the best interest of the child. 137 A social study
need not be formally entered into evidence, but is automatically made part of
the record when one has been ordered.138 Garner v. Garner139 describes a
particularly unfortunate situation. The father was severely injured in a mo-
torcycle accident. The maternal grandparents, who had originally inter-
124. Coles v. Coles, 676 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ); Gonza-
les v. Gonzales, 672 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). Courts
apparently may appoint married compatible couples as managing conservators without differ-
entiating between them. See, e.g., Wimpey v. Wimpey, 662 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1983, no writ).
125. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.01, .06 (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
126. Coles v. Coles, 676 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ); Gonza-
les v. Gonzales, 672 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.03, .09(b) (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
128. Shaw v. Green, 659 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no
writ).
129. In re Van Hersh, 662 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
130. In re Van Hersh, 662 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ) (citing
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)). Section 11.03 gives stand-
ing to a person who has had possession and control of the child for six months prior to the
filing of the petition.
131. 662 S.W.2d at 145.
132. Black v. Black, 673 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ).
133. Zuniga v. Zuniga, 664 S.W.2d 810, 812, 814 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ).
134. Wimpey v. Wimpey, 662 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
135. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1975) (court will appoint parent manag-
ing conservator unless not in best interest of child).
136. 662 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
137. Id. at 682.
138. Green v. Remling, 608 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. 1980). The Wimpey court held this
result to be true in managing conservatorship adjudications as well as adoptions. 662 S.W.2d
at 682.
139. 673 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd).
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vened, withdrew after extensive testimony attempting to establish their case,
leaving the mother and the paternal grandparents to contend for custody.
The mother was not able to offer a stable situation for the child, and the
paternal grandparents, in addition to caring for the father, had a thirteen-
year-old child with behavioral problems in their custody. Despite these diffi-
culties, the attorney ad litem and the caseworker recommended that the
court appoint the paternal grandparents managing conservators. The trial
court agreed and so decreed. The appellate court found that the appoint-
ment was not an abuse of discretion. 14°
Apparently, even an agreed joint managing conservatorship does not as-
sure a good working arrangement. In Dunker v. Dunker141 the court ap-
pointed the parties co-managing conservators pursuant to an agreement, but
within a year the conservators were back before the court requesting a modi-
fication. The father's affidavit swearing to the need for early relief1 42 alleged
difficulty in continuing the co-managing conservator arrangement because
the mother had moved to Indiana. The trial court found that circumstances
had materially changed and that retention of the mother as co-managing
conservator would be injurious to the welfare of the child. The court then
appointed the father managing conservator and the mother possessory con-
servator. The appellate court affirmed, stating that the best interest of the
child must always be of primary concern. 143 Dalton v. Doherty'44 represents
a case of a de facto joint custody agreement. The father was appointed man-
aging conservator and the mother possessory conservator, though each was
to have the right to possession of the children one-half of the time. Approxi-
mately three years later, the arrangements broke down and the father filed a
motion to modify, requesting the trial court to specify the terms and condi-
tions for access to the children. The court heard evidence and considered a
social study that was not entered into the record. The court decided to place
the younger child with the mother at all times except even weekends of the
month, but did not name her managing conservator. The father objected,
stating that this change was so extreme that it constituted a de facto change
in managing conservator. The appellate court agreed. Since the social study
that the trial court had relied upon had not been made a part of the record,
the appellate court had no evidence before it to support a finding that reten-
tion of the father as managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare
of the younger child.145 The court, therefore, reversed and remanded.
146
Still another Lype of joint custody arrangement is exemplified by Guy v. Stub-
140. Id. at 417. •
141. 659 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
142. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(d)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). This sec-
tion requires an affidavit containing allegations, along with supporting facts, that a child's
environment may endanger his physical or emotional well-being to support a motion to modify
a court order by changing the managing conservator.
143. 659 S.W.2d at 108.
144. 670 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
145. Id. at 424.
146. Id.
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berfield.147 The parties are not and have never been married, but immedi-
ately after the birth of their child the natural mother consented to the
father's legitimating the child. The decree named the mother managing con-
servator. At the time of the decree an agreement between the parents that
predated the child's birth specified that time with the child and expenses
would be shared equally. All went well for two years until a dispute arose
between the parents and the child was used as a pawn. The mother refused
to give the father access to the child, thus denying the child a beneficial
arrangement. 48 The appellate court found that the mother's actions raised
some serious fact questions regarding her retention as managing conservator
and reversed the trial court's granting of a motion to dismiss.149
When a modification suit is tried before a jury and the evidence on conser-
vatorship does not support the jury findings, the court should order a new
trial, since it cannot contravene the verdict of the jury.1 50 Entering a judg-
ment not withstanding the verdict on the issue of managing conservatorship,
therefore, is improper.151 When any evidence supports a contention that the
circumstances of the custodian and the children have materially changed, a
court should hear all the evidence before ruling. If the court rules too
quickly, the appellate court must reverse and remand, since a no evidence
point will not be sustainable.' 52 A court can consider a remarriage as evi-
dence of a material change in circumstances in ordering a modification in
conservatorship.153 The testimony of an older child who expresses emo-
tional distress and a strong desire to live with her mother can also be evi-
dence of the type of change of circumstances that establishes that a change
in managing conservators would be a positive improvement.' 54
The burden of proving a change of circumstances can be very great, but in
Blum v. Mott' 55 the court held that the mother could bring a bill of re-
view' 56 on the basis of fraud and avoid the burden posed by the Family
Code. 157 The father allegedly tricked the mother into agreeing to a change
in managing conservatorship of the couple's minor child. The appellate
court held, however, that the mother's bill of review had failed to raise genu-
147. 666 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
148. Id. at 180.
149. Id.
150. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.13(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975.1983).
151. In re Soliz, 671 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
152. Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 663 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
153. Kimbrell v. Donnell, 672 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
154. L.P.W. v. S.O., 669 S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
155. 664 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
156. When the time for filing a motion for new trial has expired and a party cannot obtain
relief by appeal, a proceeding in the nature of a bill of review is the exclusive direct attack for
vacating a judgment rendered in a case in which the court had jurisdictional power to render
it. McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. 1961). A party can successfully use a bill
of review to set aside a final judgment by proving: (1) a meritorious defense that the party did
not have the chance to present at the original trial; (2) an excuse justifying the failure to make
the defense, based upon extrinsic fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party; and
(3) the absence of fault or negligence. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (Tex.
1950).
157. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
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ine issues of fact on all the elements of fraud and affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment.1 58 When a managing conservator fails to appear at a
modification hearing after receiving adequate notice and the party desiring
modification of conservatorship offers adequate evidence on the best interest
of the child, a writ of error will be denied.1 59
Self-help may be successful when a change in conservatorship would do
positive harm to the child. In Hamann v. Morentin 60 a court split the cus-
tody of the children between the parents, even though the father had
snatched the children and concealed them for some three and one-half years
from their mother, the lawful managing conservator. When the mother was
finally able to reobtain custody, the older child was unable to readjust. The
child became so upset that the court held the situation to be the type of
extreme case that would compel the court to give one child to the father and
the other child to the mother.161
Continued contact with both parents is important to the well-being of
children, and the court should not permanently terminate a parent-child re-
lationship without good cause. 162 In the proper case, however, the court
may punish by contempt the violation of a permanent injunction prohibiting
such contact.' 63 Failure to obey the terms of a child access order is also
punishable by contempt,164 but the court cannot modify prior orders at the
contempt hearing absent proper notice and pleadings on that issue. 165 Re-
taining possession of children beyond the time permitted in the decree is also
punishable by contempt, but if the contempt order contains ancillary inaccu-
rate findings on child support arrearages, the whole judgment may become
tainted and void.166
When persons not entitled to lawful possession wrongfully detain chil-
dren, habeas corpus is the remedy. 167 In Rodriguez v. McFal1168 the Texas
Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, because the trial judge failed to
order the paternal grandparents to return the child to the mother immedi-
ately after the death of the father. A divorce action was pending at the time
of the father's death, but no custody orders had issued in connection with
the action. Since the divorce abated on the father's death, the remaining
natural parent was entitled to custody. As the Texas Supreme Court stated,
"absent an immediate serious danger to the child, a parent is entitled to the
immediate, automatic and ministerial grant of possession of the child as
158. 664 S.W.2d at 745.
159. Barrera v. Barrera, 668 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
160. 660 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
161. Id. at 647.
162. Allison v. Allison, 660 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
163. Exparte Jackman, 663 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (providing
that due process standards must be met).
164. Exparte Karr, 663 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ). The order
is void if the relator was not served and was not present at the hearing. Ex parte Ditmer, 660
S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
165. Ex parte Karr, 663 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
166. Ex parte Wood, 675 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, no writ).
167. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
168. 658 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1983).
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against a nonparent."' 69 The same standard applies to a valid subsisting
court order. The court should grant the application for the writ of manda-
mus before holding any hearing on modification of the valid decree.170 The
courts of appeals are now empowered to issue writ of mandamus in such
situations 71 and are doing so when the facts warrant their intervention. 72
Interstate custody jurisdiction is not an easily resolved problem. While a
Texas court can often decide the issue of jurisdiction, 73 a foreign court may
not necessarily afford recognition to its decision. 174 In response to this di-
lemma parties seeking custody are beginning to invoke federal court jurisdic-
tion. In Flood v. Braaten'75 a federal appeals court held that the domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction is still viable, but that a federal
court may intervene when a parent's right to the enforcement of a decree
under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 176 is violated. In
Flood the mother brought an action in federal court seeking the enforcement
of a New Jersey custody decree, in the face of inconsistent custody decrees
by the state of North Dakota. The court looked at the legislative history of
the PKPA before reaching a decision and found that Congress did not in-
tend to render nugatory the right granted by the PKPA, to have one state at
a time determine child custody.
177
A Texas federal district court came to a different conclusion in Siler v.
Storey178 when it denied a writ of prohibition against a Texas court of ap-
peals. The federal court was unwilling to assume that the Texas courts
would not protect the claimant's federal rights. Meanwhile, the Texas
Supreme Court was considering the matter and, within days of the federal
court ruling, it issued a writ of mandamus to the Texas appellate court rein-
stating the district court's habeas corpus order. 17
9
Much interstate activity provides the background for these proceedings.
In 1981 a father took his two children from the marital home in Penn-
sylvania to California. The mother then obtained a temporary restraining
order from a Pennsylvania court. When the father filed for divorce and
169. Id. at 151.
170. Schoenfeld v. Onion, 647 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1983); McElreath v. Stewart, 545
S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. 1977).
171. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1824 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
172. See Klein v. Cain, 676 S.W.2d 165, 172 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ) (grant-
ing conditional writ of mandamus); Henderson v. Shackelford, 671 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ) (denying writ due to serious immediate question concerning
welfare of the child).
173. Pettiette v. Morrow, 661 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no
writ).
174. In re M.D.T., 663 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ) (Texas
court judgment that California lacked jurisdiction to enter decree granting custody to mother
may or may not be accorded full faith and credit by California court); see, e.g., infra notes 182-
87 and accompanying text.
175. 727 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1984).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). This section relates to state full faith and credit recogni-
tion requirements for child custody decrees.
177. 727 F.2d at 310-12.
178. 587 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
179. Siler v. Storey, 677 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. 1984).
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custody in California, the mother asked the court to dismiss the suit and
enforce the Pennsylvania order. After a hearing the California court ac-
ceded to the mother's petition, but when she tried to enforce the order, she
was able to obtain possession of only one child. The father fled with the
other. The mother filed a divorce action in Pennsylvania and attempted to
obtain service on the father, but he secreted himself to avoid service. The
Pennsylvania court granted the divorce and awarded the mother custody of
both children. The mother eventually found the child and the father in
Texas and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the child.
The child was placed with Child Welfare pending resolution of the dis-
pute. The father filed a cross-action seeking a divorce and alleging that the
child had been with him over six months. The mother entered a special
appearance; the court held a full hearing and granted the writ of habeas
corpus. The father then turned to the court of civil appeals, which granted
him a writ of mandamus, but the Texas Supreme Court granted the mother a
writ of mandamus to the appeals court and ended the matter.' 80 The
supreme court's decision turned on the finding of a valid Pennsylvania court
order issued by a court that had continuing jurisdiction; therefore, the
child's presence in Texas for more than six months was irrelevant. 18'
Courts in other states have been confronted with petitions to recognize
Texas decrees. In Naputi v. Naputi 82 a North Carolina appellate court va-
cated a lower court modification because, under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), in effect in both states, 18 3 North Carolina lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that Texas had continuing ju-
risdiction and that if the North Carolina party wanted the decree modified,
the Texas courts must do it.184 In Kilgore v. Kilgore'8 5 a Missouri court
found sufficient fact questions as to the jurisdiction of a Texas court to pre-
clude summary judgment. Thus, both parties were entitled to a hearing on
the question of jurisdiction. 186 A Michigan court in Dean v. Dean187 re-
versed a trial court's finding that Texas had jurisdiction and held that Michi-
gan was the proper forum. The court based its decision on the fact that the
children had lived a greater percentage of their lives in Michigan than in
Texas. 188 Although the court found that the Texas divorce and custody pro-
ceedings antedated the Michigan proceedings, it determined that the Texas
proceedings had not conformed with the UCCJA and, therefore, did not bar
180. Id.
181. Id.; see Rush v. Stansbury, 668 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. 1984). The Rush court recog-
nized the validity of a Tennessee custody decree based on the PKPA and TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 11.53, .64 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). 677 S.W.2d at 507.
182. 67 N.C. App. 351, 313 S.E.2d 179, 181 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-.75
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983) (providing for uniform system among the states of jurisdic-
tional and conflicts of laws rules applicable in child custody matters).
184. 313 S.E.2d at 181.
185. 666 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
186. Id. at 932, 934.
187. 133 Mich. App. 20, 348 N.W.2d 725, 727 (1984).
188. 348 N.W.2d at 727.
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Michigan's jurisdiction. 189
These three decisions should signal to Texas lawyers the need to make
clear the facts on which the jurisdiction of the court is based in any custody
decision. The decree should, if possible, recite the jurisdictional facts in full
so that a court in another state will feel compelled to take notice of them. In
some situations it may be necessary to attempt to invoke the help of the
federal courts. While Flood v. Braaten'9 0 suggests that this route may be
helpful, whether other circuits will follow the lead of the Third Circuit is not
yet certain.
V. SUPPORT
The trial court hearing the suit for divorce generally establishes the
amount of child support that the parents are to pay. To issue binding orders
the court must have in personam as well as subject matter jurisdiction. 191 In
Blenkle v. Blenkle 92 the trial court had rendered a default judgment in 1974
without having jurisdiction over the payor. Unfortunately, in 1983 the
payor attempted to enter a special appearance to vacate the original order
instead of filing a bill of review. He based his case on the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act 93 in addition to claiming lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. The court held that the payor actually did enter an appearance, be-
cause the Act merely abates the action while the individual is in the service
so that at a later time the claimant may appear and defend.1 94
Evidence of the financial capacity of the parties at the time of the decree
must justify the amount of support ordered. 195 Changes in financial condi-
tion subsequent to the trial cannot be considered on appeal; however, a court
can refuse to find the payor in contempt for failure to pay the full amount
because of adverse circumstances.' 96 The appellate court can, if it finds an
abuse of discretion, suggest a remittitur and affirm the decree at a lower rate
of support. 197 Adams v. Stotts198 is an important case in this area. The Ad-
189. Id.
190. 727 F.2d at 312; see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
191. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
192. 674 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
193. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(4) (1982) (allowing defendant in judicial proceeding who was
prejudiced by reason of military service and who has a meritorious defense to reopen case and
defend).
194. 674 S.W.2d at 504.
195. See Ruiz v. Ruiz, 668 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (af-
firming order to pay $400 per month for support of five children, based on payor's gross pay of
$887 per month and custodian's pay of $800 per month); Guy v. Stubberfield, 666 S.W.2d 176,
181 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (reversing and remanding support order because no
evidence on subject was adduced at trial); Cook v. Cook, 665 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming support order of $1000 per month since amount
did not exceed father's capacity to pay); Zuniga v. Zuniga, 664 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (affirming order that former wife should pay $20 per week per
child because of her greater education and earning capacity).
196. Pierce v. Pierce, 667 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd).
The court affirmed a support order of $900 per month although evidence showed that the
payor's business might decline, which it did.
197. Blazek v. Blazek, 669 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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ams court held that a trial court determining support for a child in a pater-
nity action should consider expenses of childcare from the date of birth. 199
Furthermore, while determination of paternity is pending, the court cannot
order temporary support,200 but once paternity is established the child has
been legitimated from birth. 20' The father's responsibility, therefore, relates
back to that date. The court based its decision on its interpretation of the
paternity sections of the Texas Family Code. 202
A court can modify child support orders on a showing of a material and
substantial change in circumstances. 20 3 The movant must give at least thirty
days notice of the motion to modify2°4 and, as in all suits affecting the par-
ent-child relationship, a record of the hearing is essential.205 In White v.
Adcock2°6 the trial court did not order an increase in child support because
of the father's history of voluntary support, but the court did order him to
maintain hospitalization insurance for each child and to pay each child a
specified allowance. The appellate court held that such an order was not an
abuse of discretion and that payment directly to the children was within the
ambit of the Family Code. 207 In Stofer v. Linville208 the appellate court
reversed and rendered, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion
in increasing the support order. 209 A problem not overcome in this case was
the demonstration of change in circumstances of the payor since the evi-
dence presented concerned only his present income and not his prior
income.210
The full impact of the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984211 will not be felt until October 1985, since many of its provisions do
not take effect until then. Nevertheless, the Attorney General's office is tak-
ing seriously the requirement that enforcement efforts be publicized.212 A
number of crackdowns on delinquents have occurred, and these have been
widely publicized. 213 The Attorney General has also issued opinions inter-
The court affirmed, conditioned upon the reduction of support payments from $1,850 to
$1,200 per month. No remittitur was filed, so the cause was reversed and remanded.
198. 667 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ); see supra text accompanying notes
82, 83.
199. 667 S.W.2d at 800.
200. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.42(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
201. 667 S.W.2d at 800.
202. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.42 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)).
203. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
204. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 661 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983,
no writ).
205. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14(d) (Vernon 1975).
206. 666 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
207. Id. at 225; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
208. 662 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
209. Id. at 785.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 2-22 and accompanying text (discussing potential impact of Child
Support Enforcement Amendments).
212. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, sec. 14,
§ 454(a)(23), 98 Stat. 1320.
213. See Dallas Morning News, Dec. 12, 1984, at A25, col. 6; Dallas Times Herald, Dec.
31, 1984, at D1, col. 1.
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preting some of the changes in the Family Code relating to support. In a
ruling concerning the Family Code's mandate that decrees involving child
support must contain the social security numbers of all parties, 21 4 the Attor-
ney General took the common sense approach to social security numbers
and stated that a number need not be obtained prior to the decree for a child
who does not already have one.21 5 The Family Code merely contemplates
providing the court with social security numbers already obtained.21 6
Since the courts may place on probation persons found in contempt for
failure to pay child support,2 17 they may also revoke the probation when
those persons have not fulfilled the conditions for probation. The revocation
hearing must comply with due process, and the District Attorney should
represent the state.218 If the contemner is indigent, the court should provide
court-appointed counsel.2 19 Failure to provide an indigent with counsel is a
denial of due process, and the federal courts will grant relief if the state
courts do not. 220 Due process also requires that the contemner be present at
the hearing unless he has made a knowing and intelligent waiver, 22 1 that a
record be made of the hearing, 222 and that the decree on which the contempt
order is based be unambiguous. 2 23 A court has held the current criminal
support statute224 unconstitutional on due process grounds, because the stat-
ute shifted the burden of disproving ability to pay, an element of the offense,
to the defendant. 22 5
The managing conservator and child often move around the state, so the
original court may no longer be convenient for enforcement and supervisory
purposes. Thus, transfer provisions are set out in the Family Code. 2 2 6 The
transferee court may enforce valid judgments of the transferor court through
contempt or any other legal means. 227 Decrees dating prior to 1974 are en-
forceable,228 as are decrees a court has issued to which the transfer was not
timely, but which also was not properly challenged. 229
A court may reduce child support arrearages to judgment and may en-
force them as ordinary judgments.230 When a wife properly files the original
214. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
215. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-159 (1984).
216. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
217. Id. § 14.12.
218. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-176 (1984).
219. Id.
220. Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983).
221. Ex parte Trevino, 665 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Ex
parte Gutierrez, 661 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
222. Ex parte Juarez, 665 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
223. Ex parte Longoria, 671 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
224. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (Vernon 1974).
225. Lowry v. State, 671 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
226. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
227. See Fassy v. Kenyon, 675 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no
writ) (holding that transferee court can enforce judgment and also set it aside through bill of
review).
228. French v. Harris, 658 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
229. Ex pare Bowers, 671 S.W.2d 931, 935-36 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
230. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Vernon 1975).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
child support agreement along with an affidavit attesting to the nonpayment,
the response must contain more than a mere allegation that the amount of
the obligation under the agreement has been modified. 23 1 If no specific facts
regarding the modification are provided to contradict the fact of nonpay-
ment, the court should grant the wife summary judgment. 232 In deciding
the amount of the arrearages to use in calculating the size of the judgment,
the court should eliminate sums, such as rental fees, that benefit the wife as a
set-off, since child support is exclusively for the benefit of the child and not
the wife.233 A court may respond to a wife's request for aid in satisfying a
child support judgment by ordering the husband to deposit certain items in
the registry of the court. Such an order is not an appealable final judgment
because the court has not yet determined what the wife is entitled to and
what items the court will return to the husband. 234 A foreign support order
may be registered in a Texas court235 even after the children have reached
majority, thus enabling the collection of money that was unpaid in the
past. 23
6
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
Despite statements to the contrary, 2 37 proper pleadings and correct proce-
dure continue to be as important to the outcome of many family law matters
as findings on the merits. In re Baby Girl S. 238 is apparently such a case.
The action concerned a biological father's attempt to obtain custody of an
illegitimate child after the mother had relinquished her to a charitable adop-
tion agency. The trial court terminated the parent-child relationship of the
mother, foreclosed any rights the biological father might have in the child,
and appointed the charitable agency managing conservator. The biological
father appealed on constitutional grounds, claiming violations of due process
and equal protection, and the Texas appellate court affirmed. 239 The case
went to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the
father's allegations that the voluntary legitimation statute violated his consti-
tutional rights.240 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate
court and remanded for consideration of the alternative remedy of a pater-
nity suit under the provisions of the Texas Family Code.24 1 On remand the
231. Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984).
232. Id.
233. Smith v. Rabago, 672 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
234. In re Brecheisen, 665 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
235. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.61-.66 (Vernon 1975). These sections are known as the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).
236. Byrd v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 673 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, no writ).
237. See C. v. C., 534 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
238. 658 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
239. In re Baby Girl S, 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
240. Id., cert. granted mem. sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103
S. Ct. 784, 74 L. Ed. 2d 991 (1983).
241. In re Baby Girl S, 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Eastland), vacated and remanded
mem. sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760, 75 L. Ed. 2d
785 (1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
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appellate court held that since the trial court did not err in its decision on
the original pleading based on voluntary legitimation 242 and because the al-
ternative remedy had not been pled at the initial hearing,2 43 no remand was
available under Texas law. 244 Despite all this lawyering, the merits of the
biological father's claims as a father have not been heard.
Almaraz v. Williams245 is a similar case, but with an opposite result. In
this case the mother, a married woman, 246 relinquished her child to a private
couple who proceeded to attempt to terminate her parental rights and adopt
the child. The mother had alleged that the child's father was unknown.
When the father, her husband, discovered what had happened to his child,
he filed for a writ of habeas corpus and a bill of review. The adoptive par-
ents were served, but they failed to answer or appear, and the biological
parents were granted a default judgment and a writ of attachment. The
adoptive parents, however, refused to turn over the child and ultimately ob-
tained another hearing. At this hearing the court held that the best interest
of the child dictated that she remain with the adoptive parents. The biologi-
cal parents then sought a writ of mandamus to enforce the writ of habeas
corpus. The appellate court granted the writ, finding that the original writ
of habeas corpus was a prior court order that must be honored.2 47 A strong
dissent248 complained that the court had elevated form over substance. 249
The child had been in the possession of the adoptive parents for over a year,
so some real question as to the merits of the case existed.
In Evans v. Woodward2 50 the father was able to obtain a trial on the mer-
its, overturning a judgment nihil dicit 25 ' terminating his parent-child rela-
tionship. He was able to show that his failure to answer was neither the
result of intentional acts nor the result of conscious indifference, but, rather,
the result of some confusion in his attorney's office. The father demon-
strated that he had attended interviews with a social worker and had ap-
peared with his attorney at hearings before a master. Accordingly, the
242. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.21-.24 (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
243. The Attorney General first raised the possibility of a remedy through paternity suit in
his brief to the United States Supreme Court. In re Baby Girl S, 658 S.W.2d at 795.
244. Id. at 796.
245. 673 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
246. The mother and father became informally married around January 1, 1979. The child
was born September 8, 1982.
247. Id. at 925.
248. Id. at 926-28 (Dial, J., dissenting). Justice Dial contended that if the trial judge had
used the statutory language "a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the
child," TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983), instead of "the
best interest of the child," the majority would have denied the writ. 673 S.W.2d at 928.
249. 673 S.W.2d at 928. The dissent implied that competent counsel would have prevented
the original default judgment and would have avoided the mandamus by urging the judge to
track the language of the statute on habeas corpus before issuing any temporary orders. The
statute states: "The court may issue any appropriate temporary order if there is a serious
immediate question concerning the welfare of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(c)
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
250. 669 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
251. A nihil dicit judgment occurs when a defendant enters some plea, usually dilatory, but
does not address the merits of the plaintiff's case. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Hurley,
569 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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appellate court held that the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial was an
abuse of discretion.252 In another case253 an appellate court reversed and
remanded for a new trial on the questions of termination and adoption be-
cause the petitioners had not been heard in the trial court. The trial court
had granted legitimation to the biological father and custody to the mother
without affording the petitioners an opportunity to present their evidence. 254
In re Baby Girl P 55 is another procedural case. The court granted a new
trial, holding that the judgment to terminate the parent-child relationship
was void because it was entered four days, instead of five days, after the birth
of the child.256 The case is admirable for its enforcement of the statute, but
since the court based the termination on a relinquishment to an adoption
agency, this may be a hollow remedy. Such relinquishments are irrevoca-
ble. 257 In response to an indigent mother's request, an appellate court held
that the mother was not entitled to a complete question-and-answer state-
ment when her motion did not specifically allege errors or omissions in the
reporter's narrative statement. 258 Rather, the narrative statement should be
supplemented in accordance with her objections. 259
More cases of child abuse are being reported because of heightened public
awareness, but some of these reports are unfounded. In DeSpain v. John-
ston260 a federal district court issued an ex parte restraining order enjoining
a state court order that required the alleged abusive parents to cooperate
with an investigation. The district court delayed a hearing on the merits
until the state courts dismissed the matter. The district court then pro-
ceeded to rule on various constitutional issues that the parents had raised.
The court of appeals determined that the district court had acted in violation
of the Younger abstention doctrine, 261 vacated the district court's judgment,
and ordered the district court to dismiss the complaint. 262 The appellate
court balanced the interests of the national and state governments and noted
that family law is a traditional area of state concern. 263 The courts did not
decide the issue of whether the labeling system used in the state files on child
abuse is constitutional. 264
252. 699 S.W.2d at 155.
253. Speed v. Guidry, 668 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
254. Id. at 809-10.
255. 671 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
256. Id. at 656; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.021 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
257. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.03(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
258. Benson v. Grayson County Child Welfare, 666 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983,
no writ).
259. Id. at 169.
260. 731 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1984).
261. Id. at 1175-78 (discussing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The Younger doc-
trine dictates that a federal district court must presumptively abstain from granting injunctive
or declaratory relief when state criminal proceedings or certain state civil proceedings are
pending against the federal plaintiff once the action is commenced. 731 F.2d at 1175.
262. 731 F.2d at 1181.
263. Id. at 1179.
264. The system called Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting and Inquiry System
(CANRIS) is a central computer registry maintained in accordance with TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 34.06 (Vernon 1975). The federal courts have already considered this system, and the
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A finding that a parent has abused a child can result in termination of the
parent-child relationship.265 In Richardson v. Green266 the Texas Supreme
Court reversed a jury finding that the court should terminate the father's
parental rights to his son because of alleged abuse. When inadmissable hear-
say evidence was excluded, the court found that no more than a scintilla of
evidence remained to support the judgment.267 Since the evidence in sup-
port of a finding terminating parental rights must be clear and convincing, 268
the case required a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence.
Richardson illustrates the problems connected with determining the exist-
ence of child abuse. The evidence was based primarily on hearsay accounts
of conversations with the child that were not corroborated. A videotaped
interview of the child with a caseworker of the Texas Department of Human
Resources was introduced as evidence. The videotape could apparently
serve as a lesson in how not to conduct such an interview, since it showed
the child responding to leading questions.269 Furthermore, none of the
clinical psychologists who were called as expert witnesses would testify to a
firm belief that sexual abuse had occurred.
The Texas Supreme Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the
appeal despite the recent passage of statutes further limiting the court's juris-
diction in divorce cases. 270 The court pointed out that if the legislature had
intended to remove termination appeals cases from its jurisdiction, the legis-
lature would have said so specifically. This interpretation, of course, is cor-
rect because the termination of parental rights is not related to divorce, and
normally non-relatives 271 bring termination cases in the context of adoption
proceedings. 272 Also, the difference between a custody dispute and an action
to terminate the parent-child relationship is substantial because the rights in
question are so different. 273 No statutory method provides for the undoing
of a final judgment terminating parental rights. While a court can always
effect a change of custody after a material and substantial change in circum-
stances, 274 adoption is the only way to regain terminated parental rights.
When clear and convincing evidence of either the failure to support in ac-
cordance with ability or of activities endangering the child is presented and
is coupled with a finding that the best interests of the child dictate termina-
tion of parental rights,275 the trial court's judgment terminating the parent-
child relationship will be sustained.2
76
Supreme Court held that Texas procedures could deal with any constitutional challenges.
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979).
265. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(E) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
266. 677 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1984).
267. Id. at 502.
268. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
269. 677 S.W.2d at 501.
270. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1821(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
271. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
272. See supra cases cited in notes 238, 245, 250 & 253.
273. 677 S.W.2d at 500.
274. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
275. Id. § 15.02(1)(D), (E), (F).
276. See Navarrette v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 669 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.
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The practices of authorized public and private agencies in obtaining
acknowledgements on affidavits of relinquishment 77 were called into ques-
tion in Director, Dallas County Child Welfare v. Thompson. 278 The notary
public before whom the mother executed the affidavit of relinquishment was
an employee of the state agency interested in obtaining the signature. The
trial court held that the notary was disqualified as a matter of law. The
appellate court reversed, however, pointing out that while the notary was an
employee of the agency in question, her duties were secretarial and she had
no knowledge of the facts of the case nor any personal interest in the out-
come.2 79 This case validates the common practice of both public and private
agencies of paying the bond fees of an employee who will be asked to serve as
a notary public for the agency whenever verification of a signature is needed.
The agency must, of course, be able to show that the notary is a neutral
party and has no interest in the transaction.
In In re W.E. R. 280 the Texas Supreme Court upheld a trial court's finding
denying an adoption after the appellate court had reversed. The appellate
court had considered comments the trial judge had made after the bench
trial. Because these comments were neither findings of fact nor conclusions
of law, the appellate court should not have reviewed them.28 1 An appellate
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and, absent
an abuse of discretion, may not reverse the trial court.2 82 When the trial
judge has made no findings of fact or conclusions of law, the judgment im-
plies all necessary facts in support of the judgment. 28 3
In Walker v. Texas Department of Human Resources28 4 the Austin court
of appeals denied the prospective parents the right to adopt. The Depart-
ment of Human Resources (DHR) was granted a petition to intervene and
remove the prospective parents as managing conservators. The prospective
App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (despite mother's mental and emotional impairment, sufficient
evidence showed that she knowingly placed and knowingly allowed children to remain in con-
ditions endangering their physical and emotional well-being); In re T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d 184,
187 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (father voluntarily abandoned pregnant wife,
although she left because of his violence, since he knew where she went and he failed to tender
support); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ) (although
mental illness or incompetence are not grounds for termination of parent-child relationship,
sufficient evidence of conduct endangering child existed); C.G.V. v. Texas Dep't of Human
Resources, 663 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ) (termination judgment
citing to correct statutory grounds while erroneously reciting wrong statutory section held to
provide sufficient notice to opposing party); In re J.D.H., 661 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1983, no writ) (father's course of criminal activity supported finding of en-
gaging in conduct endangering the child); Brantmeier v. Brazoria Protective Servs. Unit, 661
S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (mother's failure to remove
daughter from household after learning of sexual molestation by father is sufficient evidence of
allowing child to remain in endangering conditions).
277. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.03(a), .04(a), (b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
278. 667 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
279. Id. at 283.
280. 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 716-17.
283. Id. at 717.
284. 667 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
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parents had obtained the child directly from its mother through an affidavit
of relinquishment. On the day following the child's birth the prospective
parents obtained a decree in Tarrant County terminating the parent-child
relationship and appointing them managing conservators of the child. The
child continued to live with the prospective parents until they filed a petition
to adopt. They then moved to Travis County, and the cause was transferred
there. The DHR intervened and, without alleging any change in circum-
stances, petitioned for a denial of the adoption and for the appointment of
itself as managing conservator. The DHR's .petition was granted, based on
the adoption portion of the Family Code.285 Claiming that the court should
have based the change in conservatorship on .the modification provisions of
the Code,286 the prospective parents challenged the judgment. The appellate
court, affirming the trial court, ruled that the modification statutes do not
apply in adoption cases.2 87 The facts of this case demonstrate that before a
court places a child with parties other than its natural parents, careful inves-
tigation is necessary. The termination proceedings apparently were done too
hastily, since they occurred only one day after the birth of the child. 28 8
285. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.10 (Vernon 1975). Section 16.10 provides that the court
may order the removal of the child from the proposed adoptive home if removal is in the
child's best interest.
286. Id. § 14.08 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
287. 667 S.W.2d at 921.
288. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text. If the prospective parents were able
both to file and obtain a judgment of termination on the same day, however, some revision of
the Code may be needed since the five-day-after-birth provision arguably applies only to termi-
nation petitions filed before the child's birth. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.021 (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1975-1983).
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